According to the United Nations, electoral violence is a type of political violence “is often designed to influence an electoral outcome and, therefore, the distribution of political power ”. Demonstrations, protests, property damage, arson, murder, physical assault, kidnapping, riots, and verbal threats are all forms of electoral violence . These violent acts can appear at any time during the various stages of the electoral cycle and is result of conflicting political objectives. Conflicts of all kinds frequently characterise India's political scene, sometimes leading to violent confrontations. With a population of 101 million (PopulationU, 2022) and located in the east of the nation, West Bengal has a lengthy history of political violence that has endured for many years and had a significant, long-lasting impact on its body politic . Since independence, the state has seen governments led by a spectrum of parties ruling the states including the All-India Trinamool Congress (AITC or TMC), which currently holds office; the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which governed for more than three decades; and the Indian National Congress (INC), which ruled for more than two decades. The tradition of violent altercations between members of political parties, particularly in rural regions, has only grown during these regimes. As a result, political violence in West Bengal has become a hotly debated theme in Indian public policy. This essay aims to shed light on the origins and characteristics of political violence in West Bengal, as well as the reasons why this state experiences a unique form of political violence that is distinct from that of other Indian states. Furthermore, this piece also talks about available data in public domain for the year 2021 from the reporting of Bengali daily, Anandabazar Patrika. and how it is highly contested with visible mismatch in NCRB data. The empirical evidence highlights incumbent political party, All-India Trinamool Congress (TMC) and other parties in the state of West Bengal. Contextualizing Electoral Violence in West Bengal For a prolonged period, West Bengal has experienced extreme violence along partisan lines. From 1999 to 2016, the state experienced an average of 20 political killings annually, according to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) records. The TMC, the state's current ruling party, and the BJP (Bhartiya Janata Party), the largest opposition, the largest opposition group, have been the primary targets of the most recent fight between party members. NCRB data reveals that since the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, there have been up to 47 political killings between TMC and BJP employees, 38 of which took place in South Bengal (Mondal, 2020). Many analysts contend that the aggressive campaign by the BJP to unseat the ruling TMC is largely to blame for the current uptick in political violence . During the heated 2021 assembly elections in the state, instances of violence even touched the top brass of both parties . Each party accused the other of attacking its leaders, but in each instance, the opposing party dismissed the accusations as political posturing. Following the announcement of the Assembly election results on May 2, 2021, the state reported a new wave of violence. Yet again, the TMC and the BJP traded accusations. The BJP significantly increased its seat share in the state Assembly but was unable to unseat the TMC despite winning the elections for the third time in a row. However, political unrest in West Bengal is not just confined to the period before or after elections. It is routine violence or the threat of violence, frequently with the tacit approval of state institutions. There is clearly a political component to this brutality. Discrepancy with National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data Finding accurate listing and recording of every instance of political violence in India is a great challenge. Given the widespread reluctance to file First Information Reports (FIRs), violent crimes are often not fully reported to the police (CSDS, 2019). The police are further prevented from registering such incidents due to political influence. Data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) has significant flaws (Bajpai & Kaushik, 2019). It is frequently observed that the statistics reported by both the government and opposition parties in relation to violent incidents differ greatly. However, the NCRB does keep track of "murders for political reasons"; these figures can be used to estimate the extent of political violence throughout the states. Newspaper Reporting of the Electoral Violence in West Bengal In West Bengal, the 2021 election is a flashpoint for violence. To study its size and impact on the life, liberty, and livelihood of the local community. We researched through the daily reporting of the leading Bengali newspaper, Anandabazar Patrika, which has over a million circulation. The 325 articles directly featured the electoral violence in the state, throwing light on the scale of the incidents of which 318 had direct reference the type of incident. The physical assault accounted to 31 per cent, the highest form of violence, followed by riots at 25 per cent and murder at 19 per cent (Table 1). The is significant level of property damage also. The newspaper reported 61 murders in the state in the year, while the 2021 NCRB report mentions only 7 murders for political reasons. Type of IncidentFreq.PercentCum. Demonstration10.310.31 Non-violent Protest51.571.89 Violent Protest61.893.77 Property Damage/Arson5717.9221.7 Murder6119.1840.88 Physical Assault9931.1372.01 Kidnapping000 Riots8326.198.11 Verbal Threat61.89100 Total318100 Table 1 Over half, 55 per cent of all incidents happened in the small towns of West Bengal followed by the villages with 35 per cent and 10 per cent in the metropolis (Figure 1). North 24 Parganas was the epicentre of the violence, where 67 incidents were reported of which 20 incidents are of physical assault (Figure 2). Figure 1 Figure 2 The violence before election account to 68 per cent, impending to State legislative assembly elections of 2021(Figure 3), there were 77 per cent incidences of electoral violence reported. The most violence happened three months impending to the election accounting to 91 per cent. The year 2021 witnessed state legislative, Municipal and by polls elections in West Bengal. Figure 3 The incumbent political party, All-India Trinamool Congress (TMC), is accused of incitement of violence directly (48 per cent) or indirectly (22 per cent) in the year 2021 (Table 2). The electoral violence research and crime records highlighted that electoral violence is been an integral part of Bengal politics through the late 1960s with the growth Left-Wing Extremism by the Naxal movement, followed by 1972-1977- Indian National Congress, 1977-2001 Left rule by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and currently with the TMC. All ruling party is accused of inflicting violence in West Bengal. Accused PartyFreq.PercentCum BJP8528.2928.29 BJP TMC6421.0597.69 ISF10.3349.34 Others10.3349.67 State20.6650.33 TMC14748.3698.68 TMC ISF41.32100 Total304100 Table 2 Analysis: Grounds for Bengal's Political Violence ‘Politics of Fear’ as a Function of Violence In a society as deeply divided along party lines as West Bengal, cadres of each party view their counterparts in other parties as the "other." Regarding the rise of a competing party, there is concern that its members may attack them while stealing their rent-seeking benefits (Jaffrelot, 2021). Young males without jobs are utilised as foot soldiers to frighten members of opposing parties (Roy, 2018). Rural party workers must suppress other party members, sometimes violently, in order to further their own material interests. Since party loyalty continues to be a defining societal fault line, all other differences appear to be interpreted as inter-party conflicts (Ashraf, 2019). As a result, the struggle between Congress and CPI (M) in previous times also included the existing class rivalry between landlords and peasants. Currently, animosity between Hindus and Muslims is a factor in the conflicts between the TMC and the BJP. This is why the BJP's accusation of TMC "appeasement" of Muslims had a significant positive impact on the former's ability to increase Hindu support in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections (Kumar, 2020). Here, seeking "revenge” is crucial. Targeted killings, especially after every election, are meant to "teach a lesson" to the supporters of the defeated party. Even intra-family conflict and the violence that results from it can occasionally be articulated in terms of political division and affiliation (Daniyal, 2018). The issue of political dominance is important not only for political parties but also for everyday party supporters, whose opportunities for a living are inextricably linked to the dominance of the party they support because of the party's pervasive presence, particularly at the lower rungs of rural Bengal. Control over Resources and Rent-Seeking Benefits from government welfare programmes were mostly made available to families connected to the ruling Left Front during its tenure (Sircar, 2018). Access to these programmes promotes social and economic stability because the rural poor are highly dependent on them for their survival and opportunities for a living (Daniyal, 2018). These resources are tightly controlled by party members working at the village level, and the struggle to control them also fuels ongoing violence in an area plagued by unemployment and poverty (Banerjee, 2011). In rural Bengal, governing party activists frequently engage in "rent-seeking" (in the economic sense) in order to both profit themselves personally and raise money for party activities. It comes in a variety of shapes. For instance, acquiring any property without the dada's approval is exceedingly challenging. Construction supplies needed to build a house must be purchased forcibly through the neighbourhood "syndicate ." Such rent-seeking grew in popularity under the Left Front's control and reached its pinnacle under the TMC administration (Roy S. , 2020). This always results in conflict between competing groups. The BJP's Ascent and the Worsening of Reciprocal Violence The BJP, as a powerful political force, ruling at the Centre and supported by other right-wing affiliates in the state, was equipped to counter any violence from the TMC. The rise of the BJP and it's constant harping on the TMC’s purported Muslim appeasement gave these clashes a strong communal colour. Even as the TMC won the 2021 assembly polls, fear and loathing grew, reinforced by post-poll incidents of violence, allegedly perpetrated by TMC workers. Apart from the ruling TMC, as the main opposition in Bengal, the BJP was found fomenting violence, especially in areas where the party is politically strong. During the polls, TMC and BJP workers routinely clashed, and murders were also reported. The BJP, despite being a relatively new force in Bengal politics, is capable of counter-violence against the TMC. This is due to two reasons: first, the foot soldiers and many notable leaders of the current state unit of the BJP are defectors from the TMC and the CPI (M) and thus understand the violent backdrop of the state. Second, as the BJP is the hegemonic political force in the country and the ruling party at the national level, it has the resources to counter the violence of the TMC with similar tactics. Economic Implications The majority of voters from rural and semi-urban areas as well as from the informal sectors, which house more than 70% of state inhabitants, cannot be satisfied with a meagre sum for social programmes. This group of people is a key constituency for the ruling political party. Therefore, not including all voters in the assistance programme could lead to anti-incumbency. An aspirant who is refused state service, for instance, may feel deprived and turn against the ruling party or even speak out against the deprived status. In order to effectively administer welfare programmes to voters at the political level, the party can either include political cadres in the effort to fix the crisis; or (ii) hire an outside consultant to handle it. In the first scenario, political cadres could receive rewards. But what may these incentives be? They undoubtedly discover a way to make agency fees (or rents/commissions) for providing state services. Such a system invites agency and moral hazard issues, which ultimately lead to organisational chaos. Because there was no overarching political ideology, the party had to recruit an outside consultant to resolve the dilemma. In both situations, the party must collect rent from the electorate to cover the agency cost (Jha, Ghatak, & Maiti, 2022). Political parties mobilise to confront such scheme failures when problems like these arise. This is made worse because the lack of implementation in these social systems could lead to scandals and political power struggles. Conclusion Violent incidents in West Bengal are primarily motivated by party goals looking to seize political power and completely dominate rivals. There is no other trend in India that has survived for as long as this one. It started in the years before independence and has persisted for more than seven decades. The ideological orientation of the violence differs noticeably from that of other governments. Ideological conflicts underlie the ferocious political violence in Kerala between the RSS/BJP and the Left. Despite the BJP's very modest dominance in the state, it has persisted for several decades. In West Bengal, things are different (Menon, 2017). Given the movement of a sizable part of CPI (M) cadres to the TMC and, subsequently, some of them to the BJP, this state appears to have an ideologically fluid political climate. The TMC's flight to the BJP of state leaders, and more recently, the BJP's outflow to the TMC of politicians, demonstrates the political pluralism of Bengal. Conflicts fuelled by regional sociocultural prejudices and communal feelings are the main cause of violence in states like UP, Bihar, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra (Chandhoke, 2021). Sociocultural, ideological, and economic variables have, for the most part, been subordinated in West Bengal to the political dominance that has led to the use of violence as a means of achieving power. The party loyalty-enmity discourse is what fuels political violence. Bengal is notably different from other states in terms of this type of violence. Political culture in the state has been deeply ingrained with the problem of political violence. Election-related pressures and pulls are no longer its only sources of influence. In contrast to other states where there is episodic or intermittent violence, West Bengal experiences "daily" violence. The party-society matrix fosters conditions that encourage such violence, as evidenced by the sheer volume of incidents throughout the state. Daily acts of violence or threats of violence are frequently committed deliberately, frequently with the tacit approval of official institutions and the active participation of party organisations. West Bengal is a good example of the "structural violence" that Johan Galtung discusses because there are constant threats of violence and systematic exclusion of those who oppose the party in power (Galtung, 1969). Therefore, it may be claimed that political violence in West Bengal is unusual, and electoral violence is a threat to peace and democracy. It is unlike anything else in India in terms of intensity and form. Such pervasive violence has a negative impact on the state's economy, strategies for resource inclusion and distribution, political structures, and legal system. Political involvement and political equality are hampered by entrenched and pervasive political violence. It is necessary to have a discussion on the types of institutional safeguards, legal protection, voting behaviour changes, and political culture shifts needed to lessen Bengal's current degree and nature of violence. The incumbent political party, All-India Trinamool Congress (TMC) and the Government of West Bengal have a higher degree of responsibility of preventing electoral violence more effectively across different electoral and conflict environments.